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Abstract
There are a number of concerns about the introduction of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System 
(NAS) of which safety risk is of paramount importance. For UAS that typically fly low and slow, the possibility of a mid-air 
collision with a nearby general aviation aircraft needs to be studied by identifying possible hazards and assessing mitigations.
The Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) is a first-generation socio-technical model that uses a Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) methodology to integrate possible hazards to assess a non-linear safety risk metric. The ASRM may be used to evaluate 
underlying causal factors linked to the vehicle and/or to the systems and procedures that led to the unsafe state and the 
interactions among these factors that contributed to the safety risk. The ASRM can also assess the projected impact of 
mitigations. The ASRM facilitates robust inductive reasoning on the hypothesized accident scenarios, ideal for addressing 
emergent NAS operations where there may be obvious data and experience limitations. Recently, the ASRM has been updated 
with the use of the Hazard Classification and Analysis System (HCAS) that provides analytic structure for categorizing hazards 
related to the UAS, Airmen, Operations and the Environment. In this paper, the ASRM, together with the HCAS, is demonstrated 
with a precision agriculture application of a notional scenario that involves an UAS being used for crop scouting. It is conjectured 
that the UAS interacts with a neighboring farm where a conventional piloted cropduster is being used for pesticide spraying.  The 
UAS being used is a rotorcraft-type where there is a failure of the separation assurance function since the UAS leaves its Area of 
Operation (AO) due to a Ground Control Station (GCS) transmission disruption (from faulty maintenance) and by the waypoints
being incorrectly programmed. The ASRM is used to analyze such a scenario leading to a collision volume being entered by both 
the UAS and the piloted cropdusterthat possibly leads to a mid-air collision. The efficacy of a geofenceor a “virtual barrier” 
mitigation for the UAS is also analyzed.  The ASRM safety risk results for this notional scenario are presented and interpreted.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Safety analysis has a fundamental role to play in the identification of hazard source potentials, the understanding 
of the underlying causal factors, the likelihood assessment of these factors, the severity evaluation of the potential 
consequence(s) of mishaps, and the prioritization of mitigations.  A sound system-level safety analysis relies heavily 
on properly identifying the key components of the area of interest. In particular, the identification of potential hazard 
sources and sub-sources within the systemic structure of the problem domain should be considered as a 
fundamentally important step in system safety analysis. 
1.1. UAS hazard modeling
Hazard identification precedes safety risk modeling.  To facilitate hazard identification in the aviation domain, a 
taxonomy, termed the Hazard Classification and Analysis System (HCAS), was developed for identifying sources of 
hazards for aircraft operations in the NAS [1]. The HCAS is a systems-level taxonomy that comprises the four main 
hazard sources of Vehicle, Airmen, Operations and Environment and their interactions as well as the constituent 
sub-sources. Note that the more general terminology of “Vehicle” is used for aircraft including UAS.  When 
operational experience matures and incidents occur, the HCAS may be used to systematically classify the event data 
into hazard sources that will connect to a high level grouping of causal factors.  Currently, there are approximately 
125 “elements” comprising the hazard taxonomy.  
1.2. Safety risk modeling
The HCAS may be used for hazard identification when considering a possible aviation-related mishap scenario.  
From the hazards, a creative process is then initiated to use language to translate hazards into risk factors that are 
causal to the undesired event.  Luxhøj [2] presents a six-step process for aviation safety risk modeling termed the 
Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM). The ASRM may be used to evaluate the causal factors linked to the vehicle 
and/or to the NextGen systems and procedures that led to the unsafe state and the interactions among these factors 
that contributed to the safety risk.  The ASRM can also assess the projected impact that new vehicle design changes 
and/or NextGen systems and procedures may have on potentially reducing the likelihood of some significant causal 
factors.  The ASRM, a first-generation socio-technical model that attempts to quantify the impact of organizational 
factors on system risk, uses the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence 
diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors.  Accidents are seldom, if ever, the result 
of a single hazard. Combining the individual hazard assessments inherent in a complex system to arrive at an overall 
level of system risk is a difficult challenge, especially for emergent flight operations with obvious data limitations.
The ASRM process involves systemically following these six steps:
x Selecting and analyzing an accident/incident scenario.
x Identifying the case-based causal factors.
x Constructing an influence diagram depicting causal factor interactions.
x Building a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).
x Inserting mitigations and value functions (optional).
x Evaluating the relative risk associated with the insertions.
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Fig. 1.  BBN analytics where UE is the Undesired Event (Source: [5]).
1.3. Building a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)
When constructing causal models, one of the most important factors that should be considered is the impact of 
uncertainty.  In essence, probability theory derives solutions to reasoning under uncertainty in the face of limited 
information. In recent years, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) have emerged as the principal methodology for 
numerous problems that involve reasoning under uncertainty in complex decision making arenas [3]. Belief 
networks provide symbolic representations of probability models combined with efficient inference algorithms for 
probabilistic reasoning [4].  An Undesired Event (UE) is not deterministic so any modeling effort needs to capture 
the probabilistic nature of multiple causalities as shown in Fig. 1. A BBN is a graphical approach that allows the 
“quantification” of safety risk models by using conditional probability theory.  It is in this step where the conditional 
probability of one causal factor given the presence of other factor(s) is estimated using the “beliefs” of subject 
matter experts.  Aviation accidents are rare events so it is challenging to obtain hard data to quantify the models, 
particularly in the case of UAS.  An event tree could possibly be used to obtain some numerical “seeds” for the 
model, but an event tree is not an influence diagram and the interpretation of the numbers is not the same.  With the 
BBN approach, the numbers in the conditional probability tables essentially represent the strength of the belief in the 
conditional causality as assessed by the expert for the scenario under study [5].  A similar approach was used by [6]
in their risk assessment study of nuclear power plants.  The approach involves moving up the systems ladder a bit 
and necessitates that the subject matter experts rely upon their mental model repository of similar cases. With a 
systems expansion viewpoint, the experts establish some basic boundary conditions, such as a towered airport, 
moderate traffic density, time period, etc. to set the conditioning context.  This systems interpretation is consistent 
with the conceptual notion of “analytic generalization”.  These conditional probabilities serve to baseline the safety 
risk model.  
2. Precision agriculture
There is growing research in the use of autonomy for UAS, especially as missions become more complex [7,8].  
However, there are a number of issues confronting autonomous operations for UAS that deal with safety and latency
[8]. How et al. [9] contend that “a critical component for networks of autonomous vehicles is the ability to detect 
and localize targets of interest in a dynamic and unknown environment”.Typically, the architecture for a system of 
autonomous vehicles involves an onboard vision module (OVM), an onboard planning module (OPM) and an 
autopilot module (APM) that work together to perform the sensing, planning and control of each vehicle. A
geofence, one component in the move towards UAS autonomy, uses the Navstar Global Positioning System, or 
herein referred to as simply GPS, to check that a UAS is within its designated area of operation.  If the UAS 
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approaches or exits this area, a return-to-base instruction is automatically executed to bring the UAS back inside its 
designated area of operation that is defined by minimum and maximum altitude as well as by lateral latitude and 
longitude constraints (http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Geofencing).  GPS performance parameters include availability, 
continuity, integrity and accuracy [10]. Badura[11] presents a general discussion of mitigations for GPS 
vulnerabilities.  There exist challenges for the integration of UAS into the NAS but autonomous operations, if 
certified, could provide a significant evolutionary step towards routine use of UAS in the NAS.
Precision agriculture (PA) involves the application of geospatial techniques and sensors (e.g., geographic 
information systems, remote sensing, GPS) to identify variations in the field and to deal with them using alternative 
strategies [12].  As an example strategy, sensors that can detect field variability, such as variable rate (application) 
technology (VRT) and grain yield monitors have been used together with high position accuracy GPS [13].  The use 
of manned airborne platforms is limited by high operational complexity, costs and lengthy delivery of products and 
a strong case is being made for the use of UAS since they are more precise, cost effective and flexible [13,14].
3. ASRM notional scenario
The notional ASRM case study is constructed from the following hypothesized scenario:
Suppose there is a geofenced Yamaha RMAX-type unmanned rotorcraft that is performing its crop dusting 
mission at the request of a land owner.  Suppose that a neighbor decides to have a piloted aircraft crop (FAA Code 
of Federal Regulations Part 137) dust his property.  It is presumed that the piloted aircraft will not remain on the 
property being dusted at all times as the pilot will fly past this property to do the maximum performance turnaround 
for the next pass.  This is uncontrolled, Class G airspace and the mission duration is 1 hour.  Although Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) has no authority or responsibility to control air traffic in Class G airspace, there are visual flight rules 
(VFR) minimums that apply.
To develop the causal narrative the following suppositions are proposed:
x What if there are local radio frequencies (RF)/power levels that interfere with the continuous connectivity 
required of the communication and control links?
x What if there is a loss of data link from the Ground Control Station (GCS) to the UAS?
x What if there are strong wind gusts (> 40 knots) that contribute to the loss of separation between the UAS and the 
piloted aircraft?
x What if there is a power system malfunction on the piloted aircraft leading to a human factors issue that causes 
the aircraft not to maintain separation?
x What if there are obstacles to avoid on both properties?
A list of assumptions or boundary conditions that are necessary to establish the contextual factors for the 
plausible scenario is then articulated. Details of the certification process for agricultural aircraft operations are 
provided in FAA Advisory Circular # 137-1A [15].Using the HCAS taxonomy, hazards are identified from the 
above causal narrative following the six-step ASRM process.  The National Agricultural Aviation Association 
(NAAA) has expressed concerns over the use of UAS for agricultural applications and has also identified a number 
of potential UAS hazards to the FAA [16]. While the above causal narrative is hypothetical, an internet search 
revealed a case of a mid-air collision between a small UAS, a SenseflyeBee 178 and an Ayres S2RF aircraft 
conducting aerial agricultural operations near Victoria, Australia [17].  The ATSB concluded that:
“This incident highlights the challenges associated with having a diverse mix of aircraft operating in the same 
airspace and the need for all pilots and operators to remain vigilant and employ see-and-avoid principles.  The 
operator of the UAV reported that due to a small frontal area, a UAV may be difficult to see and therefore a 
potential for conflict exists, in particular with manned aircraft operating below 400 ft AGL.  Where other aircraft 
may be operating in the same airspace without radios, separation is limited to see-and-avoid principles” [17].
To provide additional credence to the hypothesized scenario, the first UAS near miss with an agricultural aircraft 
was recently reported in the US in July 2014 (http://www/suasnews.com/2014/07/30229).  For the above 
hypothesized scenario, further suppose that the two landowners are engaged in an ongoing property dispute such 
that the UAS pilot and the Cropduster pilot operate in a non-cooperative communications environment.  The 
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HuginBBN software [4] is used to construct the model for the PA scenario as depicted in Fig.2Each of the nodes has 
binary states (i.e., causal factors and mitigations are either “present” or “absent”).
3.1. Data for the conditional probability tables
Model quantification involves specifications of the conditional probability tables (CPTs).  To the extent possible, 
hard data is used if it can be located through research.  Also, a number of the CPTs may be used or adapted from 
fragments of other UAS models where the CPTs were elicited using SME expertise.  Where UAS data availability 
and accessibility are challenging to obtain, qualitative reasoning typically needs to be performed.  Sensitivity 
analysis on the most uncertain CPTs may suggest where efforts should be focused to obtain more precise probability 
data. Once all the CPTs are populated and the model executed using the Lauritizen-Spiegelhalter [18] algorithm 
embedded in the Hugin BBN software, the P(MAC) = 5.924E-7.  This number is consistent with the 20 year MAC 
rate for General Aviation of 5.9E-7/flight hour [19]. The Hugin BBN deals with failure probabilities, not failure 
rates, so the exposure time is needed (Failure Probability = Failure Rate x Exposure).  A scenario mission duration 
of 1 hour is assumed.  
The ASRM PA scenario preliminary results are provided below:
x P(MAC) = 5.92E-7
x P(Collision Volume Entered) = 0.0235
x P(Cropduster pilot fails to see and avoid) = 0.0984
x P(Cropduster leaves AO) = 0.0527
x P(RMAX fails to maintain separation) = 0.0458
x P(RMAX leaves AO) = .0375
x P(Degraded Environment) = 0.164
3.2. Model investigation
Model investigation involves identifying the primary or predominant hazard clusters eventually contributing to 
the undesired event.  Fig. 3 displays the primary hazard clusters for the “collision volume entered” node in the PA 
scenario.Further investigation into the primary hazard clusters provided the output analysis in Table 1. A deep dive 
of Table 1 yields Tables 2-3 that suggests a rank-ordering of the most influential causal factors for the next level 
down.  Evidence is entered into a BBN by removing the uncertainty associated with a node.  This is performed by 
changing a probability to 1.0 and then propagating that change through the network using the Bayesian calculus.  In 
Table 2, evidence is entered for the node “Cropduster Pilot Fails to See and Avoid” and the causal factors are rank 
ordered based on their Likelihood Multiplier (LM) with respect to the baseline probability (i.e., the probability 
without evidence).  A similar analysis is performed in Table 3 for the node “RMAX Fails to Maintain Separation.”
The Likelihood Multiplier is calculated as follows:
Likelihood Multiplier (LM) =  Baseline Probability with Evidence Entered  Baseline Probability without Evidence Entered
The Logic Risk Ratio (LRR) is a metric that is used in the MIT Lincoln Labs study of the Terrain Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) and also in EuroControl studies of the international version of TCAS – the Airborne 
Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) [20,21].  The Logic Risk Ratio is computed as follows:
Logic Risk Ratio (LRR)  =  P (with Mitigations)P (without Mitigations)
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Fig. 2.Hugin BBN model for the precision agriculture (PA) scenario.
 
Fig. 3.  Primary hazard clusters for the PA scenario.
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Table 1.Output analysis of causal contributors to “Collision Volume Entered” node.
Collision Volume Entered node
Causal Factor Inputs
Baseline 
Probability 
(Collision Volume 
Entered)
Baseline 
Probability with 
P(Collision Volume 
Entered = 1)
Likelihood 
Multiplier (LM)
P(Cropduster Pilot Fails to See and Avoid) 0.0984 0.8708 8.85
P(RMAX Fails to Maintain Separation) 0.0458 0.02942 6.42
Table 2.Output analysis of causal contributors to“Cropduster Pilot Fails to See and Avoid” node with evidence entered.
Given: P(Cropduster Pilot Fails to See and Avoid) = 1
Causal Factors (CF) Inputs
Conditional 
Probabilities
LM from CF Baseline
P(Cropduster Leaves Area of Operation) 0.2095 3.97
P(Cropduster Power System Malfunction)
P(Human Factors Issues)       
0.0018
0.0574
1.8
1.15
Table 3.Output analysis of causal contributors to“RMAX Fails to Maintain Separation” node with evidence entered.
Given: P(RMAX Fails to Maintain Separation) = 1
Causal Factor Inputs
Conditional 
Probabilities
LM from CF Baseline
P(RMAX Leaves Area of Operation) 0.1362 3.63
P(RMAX Waypoints Incorrectly Programmed) 0.1483 1.85
P(GCS Data Link Transmission Disruption
P(GCS Maintenance Issues)
0.0033
0.0507
1.43
1.01
The Logic Risk Ratio (LRR) is not an absolute measure but can be used in a relative way to assess the efficacy of 
mitigations.  A risk ratio of 0.10 means that that risk is reduced to 10% of that which existed if no mitigations were 
inserted (or in other words, there was a 90% reduction in risk due to the mitigation).  The lower the risk ratio, the 
more the risk is reduced. In the first case, the Geofencing is assumed to be 100% effective.  In the second case, it is 
assumed to be only 50% effective due to some degradation in the GPS signal affecting the GPS performance 
parameters of availability, continuity, integrity and accuracy.  The LRRs were 0.1 and 0.5, respectively.  In the 
second case, relative to the first case (i.e., Geofence 100% effective), the UAS is approximately 5 times more likely 
to leave the AO.
4. Conclusions
Precision Agriculture (PA) is an innovative trend in farm management.  The integration of UAS for precision 
agriculture applications offers significant benefits; however, the safety risk needs to be understood and managed.  
The ASRM PA notional scenario provides a systems-level framework for the integration of socio-technical hazards 
related to the UAS, the cropduster, operations and the environment.  Geofencing or establishing a “virtual barrier” in 
the sky, offers one mitigation strategy in the avoidance of mid-air collisions.  Preliminary ASRM results suggest that 
the geofencing mitigation is effective in this notional scenario.
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